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Abstract: An important question to microfinance is the relevance of
existing social capital in target communities to the performance
of group lending. This research presents evidence from field
experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects
participate in trust and microfinance games. We present evidence
that personal trust between group members and peer homogeneity
are more important to group loan repayment than general societal
trust or acquaintanceship between members. We also find some
evidence of reciprocity: those who have been helped by other group
members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future.
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1. Introduction
During the past decade, exploring the role that social capital plays in economic behavior has
emerged as one of the most fascinating and fertile areas of economic research. Although
precise definitions of social capital are notoriously difficult to pin down, one of the early
pioneers of the concept, James Coleman (1988), defines social capital as “social structure that
facilitates certain actions of actors within the structure.” In his definition, Coleman specifically
highlights the roles of mutual obligation, expectations and trustworthiness, social norms, social
sanctions, and the transmission of information.
Important studies in both developed and developing countries have analyzed the
impact of social capital in economic relationships. Robert Putnam’s celebrated work, Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) and Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social
Capital (1995), brought attention to the role that social capital plays in the development of the
modern state. Christopher Udry’s ground-breaking (1994) work in Nigeria illustrated how the
social capital existing in traditional societies may allow for more efficient credit contracts than
in developed economies with weaker social capital.
This research uses experimental methods to estimate the importance of social capital
to the success of group lending, a commonly used tool to deliver credit to the poor in
developing countries. Although group lending has been shown to be correlated with higher
portfolio quality in microfinance institutions (see, for example, Cull, Demirgüc, and Morduch
in this feature), empirical work that has tried to isolate the influence of social capital on group
loan repayment has faced a number of challenges. First, social capital and its various
components are notoriously hard to measure. Moreover, groups often self-select over
different components of social capital, thus making it endogenous to actual loan repayment.
While some recent work, such as the articles in this feature by Ahlin and Townsend and by
Karlan, has made important inroads in ameliorating these difficulties, our research investigates
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the influence of social capital using a different approach. We examine the effect of different
components of relational social capital on group loan repayment by carrying out microfinance
experiments on pools of subjects that reflect the characteristics of actual microloan recipients
in Nyanga, South Africa and Berd, Armenia. In short, data from our experiments indicate that
relational social capital in the form of personal trust between individuals and social
homogeneity within groups has a positive effect on borrowing group performance. In
contrast, we find that social capital as measured by simple acquaintanceship with other
individuals or an individual’s general trust in society via responses to the standard General
Social Survey questions has little effect on group performance.
Economists have developed numerous theories that seek to explain the high
repayment rates frequently associated with group lending in developing countries. These
theories can be roughly divided into three categories: 1) those that view the relational aspects of
social capital as central to the performance of group lending; 2) those that view the informational
aspects of social capital as central to the performance of group lending; and 3) those that view
the merits of group lending (relative to individual lending) solely through its innate properties
as a joint-liability contract, where social capital plays little or no role. The distinction is
important. If the first two groups of theories hold, the existing level of social capital in the
form of strong personal relationships or local information may be critical to group lending’s
success. If the third group of theories holds, then group lending may succeed whether or not
it is implemented among borrowers with high levels of existing social capital. Our
experiments primarily seek to ascertain the influence of relational social capital on group
performance, and the type of relational social capital that is most critical to it. However, we
believe our results also may have implications for informational social capital since, in practice,
borrowers use private information to self-select over aspects of relational social capital that
may be conducive to the performance of their borrowing group.
2

In borrowing groups with high levels of relational capital, strong social ties generate
trust that other group members will contribute their share toward repaying group loans, thus
making it worthwhile for each individual to repay. Moreover, because group members are
jointly liable for repayment of the loan of each group member, they have an incentive to
pressure fellow members who fail to maximize the probability that their own share of the
group loan will be repaid. Ostensibly, the stronger the ties between group members, the
greater the potential exists for social sanctions, and thus the more likely these sanctions are to
lie off the equilibrium path, implying higher group loan repayment rates.
The most well-known paper in this category is that of Besley and Coate (1995), who
argue that without the potential for social sanctions, group lending may offer little if any
advantage over individual lending. However, given that sanctions are sufficiently strong,
group lending in their model is able to curtail the moral hazard associated with loan
repayment. Social sanctions, combined with peer monitoring also play a role in papers such as
Stiglitz (1990), Besley, Banerjee and Guinnane (1993) and Armendáriz de Aghion (1999),
though in focusing on peer monitoring, social sanctions are typically assumed to be exogenous.
In the model of Wydick (2001), sanctions in the form of group expulsion are endogenous in
that they represent a credible threat that comprises part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
punishment strategy. Given a sufficiently low level of peer monitoring between borrowers, it
is rational for group members to replace a defaulting member with a new member, even when
there is no informational evidence of risky borrower behavior. In a high-information
environment, expulsions and group replacements are only carried out if there is observable
evidence of risky behavior. The threat of social sanctions over and above group expulsion,
however, only adds to the incentive to undertake safe investments. While the threat of social
sanctions can clearly discipline borrowers in many of these papers, it is often unclear if simple
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group expulsion, and the resulting loss of low-interest credit, is able to act as a strong
substitute for social sanctions.
Papers in the second category focus on the heightened informational flows that exist
in high social-capital areas, and their impact on group loan repayment. Foremost among these
are papers by Van Tassel (1999) and Ghatak (1999) who both demonstrate that the borrower
self-selection process used in most group lending schemes improves repayment rates through
mitigating adverse selection in credit markets. If borrowers have clear information over the
riskiness of one another's projects, they sort themselves into homogeneous groups through an
assortative matching process. Van Tassel’s model in particular shows how a lender can offer a
set of individual and group loan contracts such that only high-ability borrowers will accept the
group loan contract in equilibrium. The intuition is similar to the way insurance companies
offer separate car insurance contracts to single and married drivers: Insurance companies
know that married drivers tend to be safer, and that would be irrational to get married simply
to pay less for car insurance. In Ghatak’s model, risky borrowers internalize their externality
on the group through being yoked with other risky borrowers. Safe borrowers are drawn back
into the credit pool as the equilibrium interest rate is reduced, thus increasing repayment rates.
In both models, existing social capital is important only in that it facilitates informational flow
between borrowers; social sanctions are unnecessary to their results.
A third view of group lending downplays the influence of existing social capital in the
performance of group lending altogether. The advantages of group lending over individual
lending rest on neither the potential for social sanctions nor informational flows between
members. Instead, the potential advantage of group lending arises simply from the terms of a
joint liability contract. The best example of this view is Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier
(2000). They show that, in a pool of “safe” and “risky” borrowers, if the higher return realized
by a risky borrower in the good state of nature is (uniquely) sufficient to cover for a defaulting
4

group member, then the group lending contract can reduce the equilibrium interest rate and
induce higher repayment rates relative to individual lending. The interesting point about their
result is that unlike the models of Van Tassel and Ghatak, it does not rely on borrowers having
an informational advantage over the lender. Their model is, however, sensitive to changes in
assumptions about borrower returns.
Some empirical work has sought to discriminate between these three classes of group
lending theories, but results have yielded mixed results. Wenner (1995) provides some
evidence that active screening and social pressure among members of twenty-five Costa Rican
credit groups improved group performance. Zeller (1998) finds credit group performance
positively related to social cohesion within groups. Wydick (1999) finds that while peer
monitoring appears to have some positive effect on group loan repayment, strong social ties
within groups appears to make it more difficult to pressure fellow members to repay loans.
More recent research on larger microfinance data sets has yielded fascinating, but
somewhat contradictory results on this question. Gómez and Santor (2003) use a statistical
matching model to compare default rates of 1,389 individual and group borrowers in a
Canadian lending institution. Based on observable variables, they find both selection and
incentive effects to be operational in explaining lower default rates for group loans relative to
individual loans. Moreover, incentive effects appear to be strengthened when “low trust”
groups are removed from the sample, leaving groups within which there existed a higher
degree of trust before applying for the loan. Their results, however, depend on the
assumption that unobservable characteristics are uncorrelated with borrowing group
formation. If borrowing groups admit members based on characteristics unobservable to the
researcher, the results could overstate group-borrowing effects. Nevertheless, their findings
present evidence in favor of the positive effects of informational and relational social capital
on group loan repayment.
5

The conclusions of Ahlin and Townsend (this feature) contrast somewhat with those
of Gómez and Santor. Ahlin’s and Townsends logit estimation results support the group selfselection models in the wealthier central region near Bangkok, and the models emphasizing the
importance of social sanctions in the poorer, northeastern Thailand. Yet the fact that they
find strong social ties within borrowing groups to be negatively correlated with group
repayment causes them to challenge the idea that group lending works through its ability to
harness all types of existing social capital. They argue that aspects of social capital that
facilitate social penalties for non-repayment of group loans can be helpful to group lending,
while social capital that inhibits social penalties can be harmful.
The particular angle that we take with our research is most similar to that of Abbink,
Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002), Giné et. al. (2005), and Karlan (2005), who use experimental
methods to analyze group lending repayment. We use the taxonomy developed by Harrison
and List (2004) to categorize our own work within this body of experimental research.
Abbink et. al. carry out a conventional lab experiment in which students in the social
sciences at the University of Erfurt participate in a microfinance game. Student subjects were
formed into 31 borrowing groups of varying sizes; groups were rewarded with subsequent
“loans” upon repayment of the previous loan. The game involves a stochastic element: Each
student-borrower faces a 1/6 probability of a negative shock, forcing her to depend on fellow
members to repay the amount due on the group loan. The researchers are able to draw
interesting conclusions about the effect of group size, gender, and social ties on loan
repayment. To isolate the effect of social ties, they used two separate recruitment techniques.
Some groups were formed of students registering individually for the experiment, minimizing
the degree of social ties between members. Other participants registered together in groups; in
these groups social ties were stronger. Some of their results are intriguing. Self-selected
groups contributed mightily in the first round, but cooperation tended to fizzle among these
6

groups in later rounds, while the cooperation of the randomly chosen groups started lower,
but became more stable than the self-selected groups as the rounds progressed. Their results
show that social ties within groups induce higher, but less stable, group loan repayment and
that the performance of borrowing groups with initially weak social ties may grow with
experience together in group loan repayment.
Giné et. al. (2005) carry out a framed field experiment in which subjects in central Lima
received a “loan” of 100 points. A framed field experiment differs from an artefactual field
experiment in that the experimenter attempts to replicate, or “frame” the experiment in the
context of the actual task under study (in this case group, loan repayment). Subjects in their
study had to invest their loan in either a safe project (yielding a certain return of 200 points) or
risky project (yielding a return of 600 points with probability ½ and zero otherwise). In their
experiment the researchers introduce multiple rounds contingent on project success, jointliability, complete information on one’s partner’s project choice and outcome, communication
between partners, and election of partners. The varying permutations allow the authors to
identify the importance of dynamic incentives, insurance, monitoring, free-riding, and group
formation, respectively. Taken together, Giné et. al. find evidence that group lending may
actually induce moral hazard (through risk-taking and free-riding) rather than reduce it, though
group self-selection counteracts some of these problems.
Karlan’s (2005) research employs an artefactual field experiment, which he then links to
observational data. An artefactual experiment differs from a conventional lab experiment in
that it uses a non-standard subject pool that is pertinent to the issue being studied: Members
of 41 female borrowing groups in a Peruvian microfinance program in Karlan’s research
replace the usual student subjects. He then tracks the behavior of these same subjects over the
course of one year after they received real microfinance loans. Initially, experimenters had
each of the subjects play the trust game in which either zero, 1, 2, or 3 coins are passed from
7

player A to a partner, player B. If at least one coin was passed, the experimenters matched the
contribution to player B, who could pass back as many coins as desired to player A.
Karlan finds that some characteristics related to cultural homogeneity such as both
partners being indigenous, living nearby, and attending the same church are correlated with
player A originally passing more coins, though social cohesion has a much weaker affect on
the number of coins passed from B back to A. Over the course of the next year as borrowers
repay their loans, the propensity for a borrower to pass coins in the role of player A is actually
correlated with a lower level of savings and a higher rate of group expulsion/dropout. Karlan
accounts for this result by noting that a higher propensity for a player A to pass coins may
reflect a higher propensity to gamble rather than a higher propensity to trust. Additionally he
finds that positive responses by borrowers to General Social Survey questions intended to
measure social capital are negatively correlated with default and group dropout. Taken
together, his results indicate moderate support for importance of existing social capital
between members to group lending, but specifically the importance of innate trustworthiness,
as opposed to trustworthiness driven by the fear of social sanctions.
Our research consists of both artefactual and framed field experiment components, in that
we employ the trust game used by Karlan and the microfinance game of Abbink et. al.
respectively. While Karlan’s work was carried out among indigenous peoples of Western
Hemisphere, we choose two very different locations: Nyanga, South Africa for a smaller pilot
study and Berd, Armenia for our main study. As Ahlin and Townsend show in this feature,
the relative effects of different joint-liability mechanisms may display considerable variation
between clients and geographic regions. Thus we see it as advantageous to look for similarities
and differences in the relationship between existing social ties and group loan repayment
between substantially different subject pools and geographical areas.
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We favor the microfinance game developed by Abbink et. al. because it effectively
captures the idea that group lending is heavily dependent on dynamic incentives. Individuals
have an incentive to repay group loans if they believe a critical mass of other members will do
the same, in order that they can receive future group loans. The belief that other members will
contribute in the current round is partially a function of the social capital that exists within the
borrowing group, which may be a product of a borrowing group member’s (a) generalized
trust in her society as a whole, (b) level of acquaintanceship with fellow group members, (c)
specific trust toward group members, or (d) trust that emerges from early rounds of positive
experience with other members in group loan repayment.
We use virtually the same experimental methodology among our smaller study in
South Africa as we do in Armenia, though our questions to ascertain the level of social
cohesion within microfinance game groups obviously needed to be distinct between sites.
(E.g. there are no clans in Armenia, and no post-Perestroika generation in South Africa.)
We use results from our trust games to obtain measures of trust and trustworthiness for our
microfinance games. We also include measures of existing levels of trust and social capital
between the subjects in our 36 microfinance game groups such as age, intensity of relationship,
years members have known one another, whether a subject would be willing to lend another
subject money, and distance between their homes. If our different measures of relational
social capital within our exogenously formed borrowing groups are significantly associated
with superior borrowing group performance in our experiments, then we would interpret this
as evidence that these aspects of relational social capital may matter to real-world group loan
repayment. To the extent that these measures of relational social capital are insignificantly
related to borrowing group performance, we would take this as evidence that variability in
borrowing group performance may be due to other factors which we do not account for in our
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experiments such as peer monitoring or contractual variations. We include results from both
individual group member and group repayment decisions.
Our results indicate first that specific trust between a borrower and other individual
group members appears to be relatively more important than trust in society as a whole for
group loan repayment. This holds true for our subjects in both South Africa and Armenia.
We find that group loan repayment appears to be more heavily associated with affirmative
answers to questions such as, "Would you lend (person x) 1000 drams?” than questions from
the General Social Survey intended to measure broadly existing trust in society. Second, we
find moderate evidence that social homogeneity in borrowing groups may be helpful. Having
a larger number of one's own clan as members in the group spurred individual contributions in
South Africa, while having a high number and homogeneous makeup of long-term local
residents facilitated group repayment in Armenia. Third, we find mere acquaintanceship
between members to be unrelated to group performance. Since social sanctions are generally
ineffectual without at least weak social ties between individuals, our study suggests that
potential social sanctions may not be the most important component of relational social capital
to influence group loan repayment; interpersonal trust appears to be more important.
We also find that when group repayment begins to break down from random shocks
or non-contribution, individuals withhold their own contributions, apparently to avoid getting
burned by contributing to a losing cause. But our results also reveal evidence of reciprocity:
When a member experiencing a negative shock is helped by others to repay the group loan,
the benefiting member is more likely to contribute in the subsequent round.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides details of our
experimental methodology in Nyanga and Berd. Section 3 presents and discusses results from
our experimental data. Section 4 concludes with a summary of how our results compare with
those of the existing empirical literature.
10

2. Experimental Design
Locations
We conducted a smaller, pilot experiment at the SHAWCO1 Senior Centre in Nyanga,
Cape Town, South Africa, pop. 24,003. Nyanga is a poor town, made up of nearly all black
residents, and where annual per capita income is approximately 30,553 rand (US$4,460)
(Republic of South Africa 2003 National Census). The HIV prevalence rate in Nyanga is one
of the highest in the area. The subjects were identified by the neighborhood representatives of
the local municipality and experienced SHAWCO staff as women who fit the profile of the
typical microcredit borrower in the region: eighteen years of age and older, either employed or
available for work2, and willing to participate in the experiment that took place from June 10th
to July 10th, 2004. From the pool of potential subjects, a systematic sampling took place
whereby a subject fitting the profile from every fifth eligible household was selected to
participate.
We conducted our second, larger experiment at the Artig Business Company (ABC) in
Berd, Tavush Marz, Armenia (pop. 8,700), with per capita income 1,830,000 drams
(US$3,900), roughly comparable to Nyanga. The subjects were identified by the ABC using
the same criteria established above, with the experimental period lasting from March 19th to
April 6th, 2005. In both experiments, any women who had a previous professional relation
with either the SHAWCO in Nyanga or the ABC in Armenia or who had ever been part of a
joint-liability borrowing group were excluded from the subject pool. In Nyanga, 87 women
completed the general survey, 62 of them participated in the trust game experiment, and 60
participated in the microfinance experiment.3 In Berd, 160 women completed the general

1

Student Health and Welfare Committee, a student run NGO sponsored by the University of Cape Town.
The definition of “available for work” considered whether the potential subject could participate in the
Masizikhulise Project.
3
Tests on self-selection into the game in Nyanga revealed those who opted to participate in the microfinance
game tended to be slightly poorer, were somewhat more religious, and somewhat more politically inclined.

2
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survey and participated in the trust game experiment, and 156 of them participated in the
microfinance experiment.
Survey
In the Nyanga experiment, the subjects filled out a 38-question survey, which took
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes to complete. The survey contained demographic
questions such as age, length of residency, spoken languages, clan name as well as questions
related to the various affiliations of the subject, her level of participation in groups and
associations (e.g. political organizations, churches, ROSCAS, etc.).
In Berd, the subjects filled out a 26-question survey that also required about fifteen to
twenty minutes to complete. 4 In addition to questions related to demographic characteristics
and the subject’s involvement in society, the Berd questionnaire included three attitudinal
questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) that relate to trust (also used in Karlan,
2005).5 The subjects were guaranteed a minimum of 1,500 drams upon completion of the
survey and the two follow-up activities with final payment depending on the outcomes of the
games. (We were careful not to mention the word “game” or “play” in favor of the more
neutral terms “activity” and “decision making”).
After completing the surveys, the subjects participated in the trust game and
microfinance game experiments. In Berd we alternated the order in which the experiments
were played to account for the possible dependence of one game’s results from the results of
the game previously played.

4

Both the Berd and Nyanga surveys are available at http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/acassar.
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The three GSS questions we used were the commonly administered trust question, “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be to careful in dealing with people?”, the
question on fairness, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or
would they try to be fair?", and the question on helpfulness, "Would you say that most of the time people try
to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?".
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Trust Game
As in the original trust game design of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), pairs of
individuals are randomly matched and assigned the role of either “sender” or “receiver.”
In the Berd experiment, our largest subject pool, we ran two kinds of treatments: a treatment
with equal initial endowments (senders and receivers starting with 1,000 drams), as well as a
treatment with unequal endowments (senders starting with 1,000 drams and receivers starting
with 400 drams). In Nyanga we ran only the unequal starting endowment treatment with
senders starting with 25 rand and receivers starting with 10 rand. We used the treatment with
unequal endowments because it more closely represents an actual microfinance situation in
which both initial assets and returns are seldom equal between members, as well as to explore
fairness issues in the trust game.
The trust game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the sender has to choose how
much of the initial endowment to send to the receiver (the ratio of the amount sent to the
initial endowment is considered a measure of trust). The amount sent is then multiplied by
three by the experimenter and passed to the receiver. In the second stage, the receiver then has
the opportunity to return some of the received amount back to the sender (the ratio of the
amount returned to the amount received is considered a measure of trustworthiness).
In Berd, approximately two weeks after completing the general survey, twelve groups
of ten to eighteen subjects, were formed and allocated to the different games, depending on
whether they were chosen to play the trust game before or after participating in the
microfinance game. In addition, as we explain below, we did control for whether the subjects
began their professional lives before (or during) perestroika or post-perestroika. The reading
of the instructions occurred in front of the entire group. During the actual playing of the
game, the pairings remained anonymous.
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In Nyanga, the trust game experiments were played between pairs of individuals from
opposite sides of town with no previous level of social connection. Approximately one week
after completing the general survey, six groups of fourteen to eighteen subjects were randomly
formed and over the course of four days were called to the SHAWCO Senior Center. As in
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000), the subjects saw with whom they were
matched but we ensured that they had never met one another before the game to control for
the effect of personal social connectedness on trust behavior. Individuals who arrived
together or talked with each other were not paired together; otherwise, they were paired so as
to maximize the physical distance between their households and, therefore, to minimize the
chances that they had a personal relationship (corroborated by an exit interview). The pairings
were not made public before the reading of the instructions. 6 The subjects were then divided
into two groups, senders and receivers. One pair at a time, they proceeded into a different
room where a second experimenter ran the trust game experiment and administered the exit
questionnaire. Summary results from the trust games are given in the appendix in Table A-1.
Microfinance Game
The microfinance experiment follows Abbink et. al. (2002), with some minor
modifications. A group of six individuals receive a loan of 30 rand (3,000 drams in Berd), for
which all group members are jointly liable for repayment. The loan enables each member of
the group to invest 5 rand (500 drams) in an individual risky project. All projects are of the
same type and the probability of success is 5/6. In the event of a successful project, the
investor receives a project payoff of 12 rand (1200 drams). If the project fails, however, the
subject receives zero.
After the outcomes of the projects are realized, the group loan plus interest must be
repaid. We assumed a group loan interest rate of 20%, so that the group is liable to repay a
total amount of 36 rand (3600 drams). The individuals whose project failed cannot contribute
6

Instructions for all experiments are available at http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/acassar.
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to group loan repayment, so the group debt is split among those individuals whose projects
succeed and decide to contribute. Information on the individual project’s success or failure is
private so that no other member of the group can ascertain whether a group partner’s defaults
are due to project failure or strategic decision-making. In this environment, loan repayment
ensues in the absence of contract enforceability.
Since the debt is evenly divided among those individuals who are both able and willing
to contribute, the fewer the number of contributors, the higher their burden. Since
contributions can only be financed from the current project payoffs, full repayment is only
possible if at least half of the group members (three subjects) decide to contribute. At the end
of the round, the players are informed about the number of contributors, but not their
identities, and their resulting payoff (one’s project payoff minus own share of repayment).
If the group fulfils its repayment obligation, the game continues into a further round, which
proceeds in the same way with the same group members. If more than half the group
members default, regardless of whether the default is strategic or due to project failure, then
the group cannot repay the full amount, and no further rounds are played. We like this feature
of the game because it replicates the dynamic incentives utilized by most microfinance
institutions, which make follow-up loans conditional on the full repayment of previous loans.
One aspect of the experiment of Abbink et. al. has been questioned by some
researchers (for example Morduch and Armendáriz de Aghion, 2005), namely that the results
of the experiment are more difficult to interpret because participants are told that it will
consist of a finite number of rounds (ten), leading to the traditional unraveling problem in
which non-contribution in all rounds is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We consequently
modify their experiment slightly by creating, after the sixth round, a 1/6 probability that a
group continues for another round. To minimize contamination from subjects taking into
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account an impending end-game, we utilize data from rounds one to six in our analysis. (Our
fundamental results are unchanged by excluding the small amount of data from later rounds.)
To most efficiently isolate the effect of social capital on group performance, the
microfinance game groups were formed so as to maximize the number of group members
who shared the same clan name in Nyanga. To carry out tests for social homogeneity within
groups, some groups were “stacked” with individuals who shared the same clan name, which
were made public during pre-game introductions; otherwise, they were randomly formed.
The microfinance experiments were played about one week after the trust game experiments.
In the Berd experiment, one-third of the microfinance groups were formed by those
who began their working lives before or during perestroika, one-third by individuals who
began their working lives post-perestroika, and one-third was mixed (we used a cut-off age of
36 to identify this). The experiments were played either one week before the trust games or
one week after, depending on the subject pool. Subjects knew who belonged to their
microfinance group in order to test for the effect of heterogeneity on repayment.
3. Empirical Results
We perform estimations on two separate units of observation. First, we look at the
repayment behavior of individuals in the microfinance games as a function of (a) negative
shocks to themselves and the other five group members; (b) contributions by other members;
(c) measures of acquaintanceship and personal trust level between the given individual and
other members in the group; (d) measures of generalized trust by the given individual in the
society and culture around them; (e) results from the trust game; and (f) social/cultural group
homogeneity between the individual member and other group members. (Means and standard
deviations of our independent variables are provided in Table 1.)
Ideally for our type of unbalanced panel data, one would like to employ fixed or
random effects estimation. However, the time-invariant nature of most of the important
16

variables in our study precludes fixed-effect estimation. We carried out a Hausman test for the
feasibility of a random effects estimator (which can be used on time-invariant data) vis-à-vis
fixed effects on our four time-variant variables, but the Hausman test rejected the null
hypothesis of exogeneity of these right-hand-side variables at the 1% level. Instead, we run
OLS on the average contribution of each individual for every round in which the borrower
was able to contribute to group repayment (experienced no shock), the only weakness with
this approach being possible path dependence in the denominator of the dependent variable.
We report these estimations for our pilot study in Nyanga and our larger study in Berd in
Table 3. To act as a check on these estimations for our principal study in Berd, we employ a
logit estimation on our pooled, unbalanced panel data in Table 4, being aware that such an
estimation does overweight the frequency of individuals in the sample from groups with
longer duration. We therefore employ an additional check on these estimations, which is also
included in Table 4, a logit estimation on individual rounds in Berd, for which there is no
doubt of pure exogeneity or sample bias, but where estimations are performed on a sequence
of smaller samples. To respect space constraints, we include rounds 2 through 5, before most
groups had ceased repayment; the estimations on later rounds yield little additional insight, but
are available upon request. Fortunately, we find remarkable consistency from our three types
of estimations on individual repayment.
Next, we examine the repayment behavior at the borrowing group level using means
and aggregates of many of these variables for each group of six borrowers. We present the
results in Table 5, where we first show estimations for the 26 microfinance game groups in
Berd. The dependent variable is the number of rounds of borrowing group survival, upon
which we carry out OLS estimations. Summaries of group longevity and contribution rates in
Berd and Nyanga are in Table 2. In this table we also present some estimations where we
combine the Berd-Nyanga data set of 36 groups. For both Nyanga and Berd we created
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measures of group heterogeneity along the lines of what seems to be the most important
cultural divisions in the respective societies. In Nyanga the greatest cultural distinction seems
to fall along the lines of clan membership. But in Berd, due to the tremendous changes in
post-Soviet society, the greatest social and cultural division there is not ethnic, but
generational. Those who began work after Perestroika possess an economic and cultural
outlook that is unusually distinct from that of the older generation. Along these lines we
created statistically comparable indices of heterogeneity for our 36 borrowing groups, 10 in
Nyanga and 26 in Berd. While the differences in heterogeneity are obviously quite distinct
(ethnic vs. generational), we think it worthwhile to examine some aggregated measure of
heterogeneity across our two study areas. We also examine heterogeneity in groups between
“insiders” and “outsiders”, creating an index that is more heterogeneous (homogeneous) if the
group contains a larger (smaller) variation of long-term residents and newcomers as measured
by the standard deviation in the number of years of members’ local residency. We summarize
our results below and juxtapose them to those of related empirical literature when appropriate
comparisons can be made:
(a) Shocks
To no surprise, the results show that negative random shocks impact both individual
and group repayment. In our Berd estimations we found individual repayment to be higher
when a member had received a shock the period before (implying other members had covered
for her). Repayment also increased as a function of the total number of shocks in the OLS
estimations (recalling that our reference for individual repayment includes those rounds only in
which she did not receive a negative shock). We interpret this as evidence of reciprocity among
our subjects: As an individual has been helped by other group members, she is more likely to
contribute given the opportunity the next time. The effect is large and statistically significant
at the 1% level. For every additional negative shock received, it increases the fraction of times
she contributes on average somewhere between 0.30 and 0.40, depending on our specification.
18

This finding supports a large theoretical literature on the prevalence and importance of
reciprocity among similar populations pioneered by Scott (1976) and Fafchamps (1992).
Shocks to other members have a negative effect on individual contributions, which is
statistically significant in Nyanga. It appears that when players sense that the end of the game
is impending due to a lack of contributions by other members, this causes the individual to
want to avoid being the “sucker” who contributes futilely in the last round. In the group
estimations in Table 5, we see that an increase in the mean number of shocks per round by
one reduces the number of rounds the borrowing group continues to receive loans by
about 1.7.
(b) Effect of Others’ Contributions
Theory would posit that the contributions of other group members could have
differential effects: Contributions by other members could generate peer effects or fairness
effects that stimulate one's own contribution, or it could provoke free-rider problems. In Berd
we find very modest evidence that the contributions of others in the prior period increase
one's own desire to contribute in the following period. While none of the coefficients is
significant, the variable consistently carries a positive sign on repayment in every specification.
(c) Personal Trust
Our principal measure of personal trust is the question, "Would you lend (person x)
1000 drams (100 rand)?” Answering yes to this question for increasing numbers of individuals
in the group has a positive effect on both individual contributions and group longevity. The
coefficient carries the (correct) positive sign in virtually all of the estimations, and is statistically
significant at the 1% level in our most important estimation on the entire sample in Table 4.
These results would seem to be consistent with Abbink et. al. (2002) who find that randomly
formed groups perform less well than self-selected groups of friends, among which a greater
level of trust presumably exists.
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We interpret these results on personal trust as some evidence for the importance of
screening and self-selection in borrowing groups; personal trust appears to play a far more
important role than simple acquaintanceship. Mere acquaintanceship with other individuals in
the group before the experiment (“Do you know person x?) is insignificant in virtually all of
the estimations, and negatively significant in round 5 in Table 4. The implication is that group
lending may not be successful when people simply know one another well; it is more likely to
succeed where people can choose among a large number of trustworthy group members.
Moreover, the data show distance between members’ homes to be (surprisingly) positively
related to group performance. To the extent that someone needs to know another individual,
or at least know of her and live somewhat close to her to impose some type of social sanction
in response to suspected defections in the game, our results offer little support to Besley and
Coate’s (1995) hypothesis that the potential for social sanctions is vital to group lending.
Trust that others will contribute their share is far more significant in our study.
(d) Generalized Trust
While generalized trust in society is likely to be integral at a broader level, such as in
the establishment of institutions and governance structures, positive answers to the General
Social Survey questions proved to be insignificant as a determinant of behavior in the
microfinance game, and often carry an unexpected sign. This is consistent with the results of
Frey and Bohnet (1999), who find that an accurate portrayal of cooperative behavior is only
revealed when “social distance” diminishes and subjects interact with an identifiable person.
Our finding contrasts somewhat in this respect with Karlan (2005) who finds that the GSS
survey questions relative to societal trust were negatively associated with default among his
sample of Peruvian microfinance borrowers. It is difficult to explain the insignificance of
social capital reflected in the GSS questions, other than by noting that this fits a pattern in our
empirical results. This pattern clearly points to the relative importance for group lending of
personalized trust over generalized trust in society, and that answers to specific, contextual
questions, such as "Would you lend (person x) 1000 drams (100 rand)?” are a more powerful
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indicator of behavior than generalized questions. Thus, if group members have an interest in
being members of well-functioning groups, then self-selection should create endogenously
formed groups with a high level of specific trust among members. Because self-selection relies
on specific trust and not general trust, our results would suggest that self-selected groups
should function better. This result appears consistent with what Ahlin and Townsend (this
feature) find on the importance of self-selection and screening among their borrowers in
central Thailand.
(e) Effect of Trust Game Results
We use our trust game to generate measures of both trust and trustworthiness that may
be useful in understanding behavior in our microfinance game. In short, consistent with
Karlan (2005), in our experiment, we uncovered no evidence that trusting behavior is at all
positively related to greater rates of contribution to group loans. (He actually finds that it is
negatively related, and interprets the result as possibly due to risk-loving behavior.)
We find some evidence that trustworthiness is related to contributions, an effect that
is fairly substantial in the Berd estimations: If a receiver returned all of the coins passed to him
in the trust game, it increases his probability of contribution in the microfinance game by
about 40 percentage points. Thus, a subject who was trustworthy as a receiver in the trust
game tended to be a strong contributor in the microfinance game. Since players were
anonymous in the trust game, the significance of the trustworthiness variable may reflect
borrower quality or dependability, meaning that a community of dependable people may be
likely to be a community of well-performing borrowing groups. However, the coefficient on
trustworthiness was insignificant in Nyanga and in the group estimations.
(f) Social Homogeneity
Many researchers and development practitioners have believed for some time that
social cohesion has played a major role in credit group performance. Empirical evidence
from actual field data has been mixed on the question with some such as Zeller (1998) finding
positive effects of a variable counting the number of common characteristics among members.
21

Karlan (2005) finds that ethnically homogeneous pairs are more trusting in the Peruvian
experiments. Other results, such as Wydick (1999), find that the stronger social ties between
members, the less credible the threat of social sanctions becomes. Alin and Townsend (this
feature) also find evidence that existing social ties may hinder group loan repayment.
The results from our field experiments lend measured empirical support to the idea
that social homogeneity is a good thing for group loan repayment. In Nyanga, individual
contributions are significantly associated at the 95% level with the number of members from
the same clan in the group, as seen in Table 3. Although two very different kinds of social
heterogeneity characterize Nyanga and Berd, for the combined estimations in Table 5 we use a
common diversity index of similar/dissimilar members (by clan and pre-and post Perestroika)
and find the point estimate showing heterogeneity to have negative effects, but statistically
insignificant. Table 5 also shows heterogeneity in groups as measured by long-term vs. shortterm residents. The coefficient on the standard deviation of number of years residing in the
local area has the expected sign, and is significant at the 99% level in Berd and at the 95% level
in the combined estimations. Taken in light of other research, our results support the idea that
social and cultural group homogeneity is likely to exert a positive influence on loan repayment.
4. Conclusion
Researchers face a puzzle in disentangling the diverse aspects of social capital and their
influence on borrower behavior in joint-liability loan contracts. We view our experimental
results as one piece to this puzzle. In contrast to other work, including the other work in this
feature, we employ artefactual and framed field experiments that allow us to work at the
problem from a particular angle through imposing a maximum degree of exogeneity on our
estimations, while using subjects who closely represent the population of individuals that
actually receives group loans in developing countries. We view this kind of experimental work
relative to other techniques, such as estimations on field data, not as substitutes, but instead as
complements in this puzzle-solving process. Our goal for this research, and its contribution to
this feature, is that it be part of an effort that collectively triangulates on a better understanding
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of group lending. In this sense we cannot claim general inference from our findings, but
instead that our results be viewed in light of the wide array of empirical methodologies focused
on the same question. Taken in this context, it is interesting that our results support many of
the traditional beliefs about group lending and work from other types of empirical studies.
At the outset of this paper we divided theories about group lending into three
categories: those that emphasize the importance of relational social capital to group lending,
those that emphasize the importance of informational social capital, and those that emphasize
the inherent contractual benefits of joint-liability contracts. That we find socially
heterogeneous groups consistently performing worse than socially homogeneous groups
supports the notion that relational social capital matters to group lending. Social homogeneity
appears to facilitate a confidence that other members will indeed repay, augmenting the belief
that the group is likely to receive subsequent loans in the future, and that those who do repay
in early rounds won’t get burned by non-repayers. We also find evidence of reciprocity within
groups as group members who have realized more shocks (and relied on others to pay for
them in the past) are more likely to repay the next time they have the opportunity. Thus we
find that social capital appears to grow with positive experiences from other members
following through with repayment in the group.
Additionally, we believe that our finding that personal trust between specific pairs of
group members significantly affects performance in our microfinance games is significant.
First, it implies that group lending is likely to be more successful when a borrower faces a pool
of potential borrowing partners that contains a large number of people whom she personally
trusts. Moreover, to the extent that borrowers have a choice within this pool, it supports the
notion that informational social capital in the process of group self-selection and screening is
likely to matter in group lending. Although in our experiments borrowing groups are formed
exogenously, if personal trust matters to group performance in practice, then borrowers will
have an incentive to self-select over this variable.
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In contrast, we find traditional measures of general, society-wide social capital, such as
reflected by the commonly used GSS questions to be mostly insignificant. In many respects,
this result is unsurprising: Repayment under dynamic incentives is individually rational when
group members believe that the group as a whole will perform well enough to continue
receiving future loans. This should depend on the confidence that borrowers have in the
particular individuals within the borrowing group far more than their confidence in society
generally. That we find the strength of acquaintanceship between members and the distance
between their homes to be insignificantly (and in some specifications negatively) related to
group performance would seem to imply that the most important component of relational
capital may be interpersonal trust between members rather than the underlying threat of social
sanctions for non-contribution.
One caveat to our findings and those from similar research based on field data is that a
high degree of social capital between group members is probably insufficient in and of itself to
generate high repayment rates. For example, the relative importance of within-group social
capital in preventing defaults may well be weaker than the mere threat of group expulsion, the
availability of alternative credit, or the intensity and quality of loan officer activity. As shown
in Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (this issue), other institutional factors matter greatly to
borrower performance and the performance of microfinance institutions generally, such as
investments in quality loan officers and other staff. There is probably no single factor that is
alone responsible for the frequent success with group lending in so many areas of the
developing world, but this research suggests that relational social capital between members
appears to be one significant factor in this success.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Berd,
Armenia

Nyanga,
South Africa

X,σ

X,σ

No. Observations

n = 26

n = 10

No. Observations

Number of Rounds
Reached by Group

4.192

3.000

(1.650)

(1.563)

Subject Contributes
in Round

1.119

1.358

(0.678)

(0.416)

1.489

0.733

(1.033)

(0.424)

1.590

0.450

(0.849)

(0.385)

26.727
(5.428)

Group Repayment
Variables:

Mean Per Period
Shocks
Received by Group
Mean Number of
Others Acquaintances
in Group
Mean Number Others
Would Loan to in
Group
Mean Distance, km
b/t Members’ Homes

Shocks to Others in
Group
Period Before

X,σ
n = 498
0.731
(0.444)
0.143
(0.350)
0.713
(0.800)
3000.00
(416.94)

10.851
(1.705)

Num. of Acquaintances
in Group

1.382
(1.318)

Num. of Group
Members Subject
Would Loan to

1.677

17.867

2.427

(13.114)

(0.383)

Heterogeneity-Fraction
Life Lived in Area

0.243
(0.129)

0.750
(0.339)

Percent Members
Work After
Perestroika/Same Clan

0.587

0.400

(0.3589)

(0.378)

0.298

0.477

(0.243)

Sender Trust

Shock to Subject
Period Before

Berd,
Armenia

Contrib. by Others
in Group - Period
Before (Dram)

Mean Fraction of Life
Lived in Area

Heterogeneity in
Peer Group/Clan,
(given by std.dev.)

Individual
Repayment
Variables:

Mean Distance
to Others’ Homes
Fraction of Life
Lived in Area

(1.753)
26.668
(8.028)
0.1684
(0.266)
0.752

(0.402)

Fraction of Others
in Peer Group

(0.250)

0.428
(0.158)

0.334
(0.103)

Sender Trust
(Only Senders)

0.431
(0.246)

Receiver
Trustworthiness
(Only Receivers)

0.441
(0.228)

Receiver
Trustworthiness

0.437

0.360

(0.140)

(0.192)

GSS#1:
Trust Question

0.660
(0.200)

GSS#1:
Trust Question

0.637
(0.481)

GSS#2:
Fairness Question

0.679
(0.194)

GSS#2:
Fairness Question

0.677
(0.468)

GSS#3:
Helpfulness Quest.

0.346
(0.210)

GSS#3:
Helpfulness Question
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0.357
(0.480)

Table 2: Frequencies of Failures and Contribution Decisions
(number of groups, number of actual contributors)

Round
Number

Berd, Armenia
% Failures

1

Nyanga, South Africa

% Contributions

% Failures

71.79%

15.0%

21.79%
(26, 112)

2

16.0%

3

15.87%

62.67%

25.93%

62.70%

13.33%

57.29%

9.72%

33.33%

63.89%

11.11%

50.0%
(3, 9)

16.67%

(12, 46)
6

56.67%
(5, 17)

(16, 55)
5

48.15%
(9, 26)

(21, 79)
14.58%

68.33%
(10, 41)

(25, 94)
4

% Contributions

50.0%
(2, 6)

70.37%
(9, 38)

33.33%

66.67%
(1, 4)
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Table 3: Individual Repayment Decisions--Nyanga and Berd
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Times Repaid Divided by Opportunities to Repay†
---OLS Estimations---

Variable:

Indiv. Repayment:
Nyanga, South Africa

Indiv. Repayment:
Berd, Armenia

No. of Observations:
Intercept

n = 54
1.296***
(0.363)

n = 54
1.294***
(0.362)

n = 151
0.629***
(0.200)

n = 151
0.621***
(0.221)

Mean Contribution
from Others

-0.539*
(0.349)

-0.496
(0.349)

-0.256
(0.193)

-0.261
( 0.202)

Mean Shocks
Received--Self

-0.111
(0.276)

-0.096
(0.279)

0.347***
(0.137)

0.335***
(0.141)

Mean Shocks
Received—Others

-0.215*
(0.138)

-0.198
(0.138)

-0.036
( 0.045)

-0.036
(0.046)

Knows Others
in Group

0.058
(0.108)

0.026
(0.109)

-0.013
(0.021)

-0.013
(0.022)

Mean Would Loan to
each Indiv. in Group

-0.015
(0.121)

0.036
(0.123)

0.039***
(0.016)

0.038***
(0.016)

Mean Distance
to Others’ Homes

0.004
(0.018)

0.002
(0.018)

0.006***
(0.003)

0.006***
(0.003)

Fraction of Life
Lived in Area

-0.077
(0.070)

-0.051
(0.072)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.0009)

Fraction of Others
in Peer Group/Clan

0.178***
(0.078)

0.183***
(0.078)

0.033
(0.107)

0.033
(0.108)

Average Sender Trust
From Trust Game

-0.151
(0.286)

0.046
(0.122)

0.061
(0.126)

Average Receiver
Trustworthiness

-0.293
(0.200)

0.098
(0.121)

0.105
(0.123)

GSS#1:
Trust Question

-0.034
(0.061)

GSS#2:
Fairness Question

0.017
(0.061)

GSS#3:
Helpfulness Question
Nyanga Dummy

0.067
(0.056)

R-Squared
Adj R-Squared
F-Statistic
F-Signif.

0.1882
0.0439
1.30
0.265

0.2272
0.0475
1.26
0.280

0.1222
0.0600
1.96
0.042

***95% Significance, **90% Significance, *85% Significance.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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0.1326
0.0509
1.62
0.086

Table 4: Individual Repayment Decisions in Microfinance Game--Berd
Dependent Variable: Individual Contributes in Round = 1
---Binary Logit on Pooled Panel Data---

Only
Trustors

Only
Trustees

All Rounds

Round 2

Round 3

Round 4

Round 5

n = 213
-2.981
(4.780)

n = 214
-4.789
(4.360)

n = 427
-3.335
(3.127)

n = 126
-12.061*
(8.163)

n = 106
-2.630
(8.986)

n = 82
-3.059
(8.685)

n = 65
-5.935
(8.468)

Subject Contributed
Period Before

1.936**
(1.184)

1.435
(1.064)

1.766***
(0.773)

3.023*
(2.027)

2.077
(2.266)

2.956
(2.165)

2.744
(2.277)

Shock to Subject
Period Before

1.452***
(0.545)

0.770
(0.630)

1.131***
(0.401)

1.096
(1.077)

1.412*
(0.993)

1.562*
(1.039)

3.871***
(1.583)

Shocks to Others in Group
Period Before

-0.373*
(0.247)

-0.179
0.236

-0.253*
(0.165)

-0.043
(0.420)

-0.053
(0.541)

-0.375
(0.386)

-0.386
(0.668)

Contributions by Others
in Group - Period Before

0.0002
(0.001)

0.0007
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.0009)

0.002
(0.002)

0.0004
(0.002)

0.0004
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

Num. of Acquaintances in
Group

0.159
(0.163)

-0.161
(0.139)

-0.054
(0.099)

-0.234
(0.210)

-0.231
(0.238)

0.179
(0.239)

-0.448*
(0.306)

Num. of Group Members
Subject Would Loan to

0.174*
(0.124)

0.280***
(0.120)

0.241***
(0.079)

0.508***
(0.191)

0.447***
(0.227)

-0.080
(0.162)

0.353*
(0.227)

Mean Distance
to Others’ Homes

0.045*
(0.030)

0.054*
(0.021)

0.042***
(0.017)

0.087***
(0.036)

0.028
(0.042)

-0.005
(0.037)

0.100**
(0.053)

Fraction of Life
Lived in Area

0.005
(0.008)

0.008
(0.008)

0.008*
(0.005)

0.014*
(0.009)

0.005
(0.010)

-0.006
(0.013)

0.035**
(0.021)

Fraction of Others
in Peer Group

0.057
(0.732)

0.347
(0.742)

0.180
(0.486)

0.631
(0.919)

-1.041
(1.255)

2.192**
(1.187)

-1.218
(1.481)

GSS#1:
Trust Question

-0.405
(0.393)

-0.175
(0.402)

-0.228
(0.263)

-0.174
(0.556)

0.023
(0.610)

-0.070
(0.633)

-1.474**
(0.779)

GSS#2:
Fairness Question

0.614*
(0.419)

0.192
(0.395)

0.261
(0.260)

0.637
(0.539)

0.879*
(0.598)

-1.013*
(0.663)

0.441
(0.805)

GSS#3:
Helpfulness Question

0.418
(0.386)

0.174
(0.416)

0.266
(0.267)

0.116
(0.525)

1.504**
(0.827)

-0.092
(0.616)

-0.770
(0.726)

Sender Trust
From Trust Game

0.137
(0.736)

53.4543
<0.0001

25.0006
0.0148

34.9393
0.0005

17.9668
0.1167

18.3098
0.1066

Variable:
Number of Observations:
Intercept

Receiver Trustworthiness
From Trust Game
Likelihood Ratio
p-value

1.523**
(0.833)
29.4118
0.0057

34.4995
0.0010

***95% Significance, **90% Significance, *85% Significance. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 5: Group Repayment Decisions
Dependent Variable: Number of Rounds Reach by Group in Microfinance Game, µ = 3.861
---OLS Estimates---

Group Repayment:
Berd, Armenia

Variable:
Number of Observations:
Intercept

Combined Estimations:
Berd and Nyanga

n = 25
10.023***
(2.041)

n = 24
9.132***
(2.543)

n = 24
9.887***
(2.720)

n = 35
4.390***
(1.725)

n = 35
7.024***
(1.989)

n = 34
7.638***
(2.448)

Mean Per Period Shocks
Received by Group

-1.713***
(0.336)

-1.708***
(0.387)

-1.714***
(0.413)

-1.598***
(0.372)

-1.721***
(0.357)

-1.665***
(0.400)

Mean Number of Acquaintances
in Group

0.233
(0.287)

0.324
(0.331)

0.609*
(0.370)

0.057
(0.308)

0.134
(0.308)

0.013
(0.346)

Mean Would Loan to
Other Indivs. in Group

0.021
(0.318)

0.040
(0.343)

0.033
(0.389)

0.677***
(0.331)

0.433
(0.334)

0.448
(0.348)

Mean Distance
b/t Members’ Homes

-0.063
(0.048)

-0.053
(0.0540)

-0.038
(0.0515)

0.016
(0.053)

-0.018
(0. 053)

-0.023
(0.058)

Mean Fraction of Life
Lived in Area

0.075***
(0.0332)

0.090***
(0.039)

0.067*
(0.041)

Heterogeneity-Fraction
Life Lived in Area

-0.116***
(0.030)

-0.122***
(0.033)

-0.097***
(0.035)

-0.043***
(0.018)

-0.051***
(0.022)

Percent Members
Work After Perestroika

-1.656**
(0.857)

-1.457*
(9.324)

-1.630**
(0.892)

Heterogeneity in
Peer Group/Clan

-0.473
(1.07)

0.423
(1.437)

0.775
(1.669)

-0.952
(1.090)

-1.193
(1.248)

Sender Trust
From Trust Game

-1.851
(2.172)

-2.515
(2.211)

0.924
(1.810)

Receiver Trustworthiness

2.021
(2.167)

2.600
(2.344)

-1.488
(1.648)

GSS#1:
Trust Question

-2.890
(2.286)

GSS#2:
Fairness Question

-0.971
(1.765)

GSS#3:
Helpfulness Question

2.036
(1.464)

Nyanga Dummy

R-Squared
Adj R-Squared
F-Statistic
F-Signif.

0.7126
0.5774
5.27
0.002

0.7119
0.5061
3.46
0.017
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0.8015
0.5670
3.42
0.024

0.2593
(1.136)

0.1462
(1.099)

0.1514
(1.175)

0.4885
0.4032
5.73
0.0008

0.5713
0.4641
5.33
0.0006

0.5710
0.4166
3.70
0.0046

Appendix: Results of Trust Games
(A.)

Table A-1
— Berd —

Sender's Trust
(% Amount Sent to
Receiver)

Nyanga

All Games

Equal Initial
Amounts

Unequal Initial
Amounts

Unequal Initial
Amounts

25.0
30.8
29.5
7.1
7.7
156

20.8
35.1
28.6
10.4
5.2
77

29.1
26.6
30.4
3.8
10.1
79

55.0
21.7
20.0
3.3
60

0
(0 - 25%]
(25% - 50%)
50%
(50% - 75%]
(75% - 100%)
100%
Num. Obs.

(B.)
Receiver's
Trustworthiness
(% Amount Sent
to Receiver)
0
(0 - 25%]
(25% - 50%)
50%
(50% - 75%]
(75% - 100%)
100%
Num. Obs.

— Berd —
All Games
0
0

(0 25%]
29.2
26.1
63.6
16.7
35

(% Amount Sent Back to Sender)
(25% (50% (75% 50%)
50%
75%]
100%)
28.2
46.2
20.5
39.6
10.4
8.3
8.3
39.1
17.4
13.0
18.2
18.2
50.0
33.3
56
27
20
12

100%
5.1
4.2
4.4
6

Num.
Obs.
39
48
46
11
12
156

100%
12.5
7.4
4

No. Obs.
0
16
27
22
0
8
4
77

(C.)
Receiver's
Trustworthiness
(% Amount Sent
to Receiver)
0
(0 - 25%]
(25% - 50%)
50%
(50% - 75%]
(75% - 100%)
100%
Num. Obs.

— Berd —
Equal Initial Amounts
0
0

(0 25%]
37.0
9.1
75.0
50.0
20

(% Amount Sent Back to Sender)
(25% (50% (75% 50%)
50%
75%]
100%)
37.5
37.5
12.5
37.0
11.1
7.4
54.6
18.2
18.2
25.0
50.0
30
11
6
6
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(D.)
— Berd —
Unequal Initial Amounts

Receiver's
Trustworthiness
(% Amount Sent
to Receiver)
0
(0 - 25%]
(25% - 50%)
50%
(50% - 75%]
(75% - 100%)
100%
Num. Obs.

0
0

(0 25%]
19.1
41.7
33.3
15

(% Amount Sent Back to Sender)
(25% (50% (75% 50%)
50%
75%]
100%)
21.7
52.2
26.1
42.9
9.5
19.1
9.5
25.0
16.7
8.3
66.7
75.0
25.0
26
16
14
6

100%
8.3
2

No. Obs.
0
23
21
24
0
3
8
79

100%
0

No.
Obs.
31
13
12
2
0
58

(E.)
— Nyanga —
Unequal Initial Amounts

Receiver's
Trustworthiness
(% Amount Sent
to Receiver)
0
(0 - 25%]
(25% - 50%)
50%
(50% - 75%]
(75% - 100%)
100%
Num. Obs.

All Games
0
12.9
33.33
8

(0 25%]
19.35
38.46
33.33
15

(% Amount Sent Back to Sender)
(25% (50% (75% 50%)
50%
75%]
100%)
61.29
6.45
15.38
30.77
15.38
16.67
16.67
100
23
6
4
2
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